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Introduction
The number of temporary residents entering Canada is rising each year. Among those
individuals admitted on a temporary basis are temporary foreign workers (TFWs). On its surface,
the purpose and intent of Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) do not seem
complicated. It serves a function of contributing to Canada’s economic gain by conveniently
addressing labour shortages in many sectors. However, when examined through a critical lens,
the matter encompasses different issues on systemic level. These workers are integrated into
Canada’s labour market and wider social fabric, and many of them have been returning for years.
Despite the large number of workers that are channeled through this long-standing
TFWP, their experience with the program and, more broadly, within the Canadian society has
been overlooked. The dearth of attempts on a government level to evaluate the TFWP with a
focus on the precarious working conditions and integration issues facing TFWs motivated me to
explore the political, social, and economic dynamics behind it.
I start with introducing the concept of denizenship, an important theoretical framework of
which I will be situating the paper within. Second, I discuss the ways in which the longstanding
inequality is embedded in the structure of TFWP, in turn legitimizes differential entitlements and
experiences of TFWs depending on their skill categories. Third, I analyze the impact of
government discourse within the existing accountability and protection mechanisms on fulfilling
its purposes – protection of the TFWs against employment abuse and exploitation. I conclude by
recommending ways to make TFW policies more responsive to TFWs’ unique circumstances and
to enhance their social and economic well-being.

Theoretical Framework
In the colonial era, slave trade was a significant part of the political economy. When
slavery was abolished, it was succeeded by “unfree labour” recruited overseas by colonial states
(Castles, 2006). Until the 18th century, most workers laboured under the working conditions that
resembled that of slaves, which entailed exploitation, terror, brutal working conditions, and early
death (Walia, 2010). The migrant labour from settler colonies made the European
industrialization possible. Gradually, the migrant labour transitioned into a profitable form of
labour reflecting the capitalist ideology and restructuring of national labour.
As Marx once stated in Capital, capitalism relies on exploitation and class rule to
generate profit (Seidman, 2017). The expansion of global capitalist market increased the
interconnectedness across borders and built a network of commercial exchange of goods, money,
capital, and, most importantly, labour beyond the national territories (Seidman, 2017). Both
territorial forms of power and power centred around expansion of market and accumulation of
profits formed the basis of the migration legislations. The policies concerning migrants reflected
the capitalist states’ motives for economic benefits, as well as the territorial forms of the state
power, including notions of sovereignty, membership, national identity, and border control
(Marsden 2011).
The territorial basis of the states was widely institutionalized in Canada through several
explicit policies. The purposes of these legislations were to preserve Canada’s ‘Whiteness’ and
prevent non-white immigrants from permanently settling in the country (Banerjee et al., 2018).
The overtly racialized legislations were lifted in the 1960s due to post-war economic conditions
of Canada and declined immigration from traditional source countries. Declined immigration

2

from Europe meant labour shortages in economy sectors that predominantly hired immigrants.
As a result, Canada started facilitating the neoliberal migration from the global South.
In 1967, the Canadian government amended the Immigration Act to contain a specific
“non-discrimination” clause on the grounds of “race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion or
sex” (Marsden, 2011). For the first time, an individual’s eligibility to immigrate to Canada was
determined by a points system. Within the system, potential immigrants were allocated points for
their ability to assimilate and, specifically, to contribute to the national economy. As a result,
immigrant’s source country dramatically shifted throughout the 20th century (Marsden, 2011).
However, it did not address the systematic racialized differences in membership, belonging,
power, and wealth in Canadian society (Sharma, 2006).
The new immigrants did not have seamless, uniform migratory experience in Canada.
Portes (1981) developed three modes of immigration labour market incorporation to account for
varied experiences across the immigrant groups in a host country. The first suggests that
immigrants who enter the primary labour market tend to have high human capital, including
professional, managerial, and technical skills. The employment in the primary labour market is
characterized by higher wages, job stability, and great career mobility (Portes, 1981). These
immigrants are often deliberately recruited by the large corporations and institutions to fill wellpaying positions. The second mode of which immigrants are incorporated into a host society is
through the immigrant enclave, which is characterized by high rates of ethnic concentration and
businesses that are owned by co-ethnic immigrants. These firms, regardless of whether they
provide services exclusively to their own ethnic clientele, are established based on the ethnic
solidarity and provides a basis for capital accumulation, an occupational heterogeneity, and
opportunities for economic mobility (Portes, 1981).
Throughout history, temporary migrant schemes have been channelling a significant
number of migrant workers into the secondary labour market, and this constitutes Portes’ third
mode of immigrant incorporation. Secondary labour market incorporation is characterized by
unstable jobs, precarious working conditions, lower wages, and limited career mobility (Portes,
1981). Immigrants who accept these jobs in the peripheral sector of the economy typically
possess a small amount of human capital (Bonikowska, Hou & Picot, 2015). This particular
mode of incorporation demonstrates the ways in which the jobs in the primary labour market are
seen as belonging to Canadians while immigrants are expected to remain in the racialized and
nationalized second labour market and perform undesirable work. It is because, as MP H.W.
Danforth once put it, “it is natural for them to do it” (Sharma, 2006, p.100). Portes’ third mode of
incorporation can help to identify the defining characteristics of low-skilled TFWs in the
Canadian labour market.
One of the crucial features of low-skilled TFWs in the secondary labour market is their
denizen status. Denizenship refers to an inferior social status that is differentiated by the related
concepts of freedom and unfreedom (Benton, 2014). Based on this definition, some immigration
scholars have exemplified permanent residents as denizens whose status is inferior to the citizens
(Hammar, 1990). While the magnitude of unfreedom of which permanent residents are subjected
to may vary by countries, the permanent residents in Canada enjoy comparable treatment,
entitlement, and public recognition to citizens. They have the right to freely move and remain
permanently in Canada along with unlimited access to social and economic benefits.
Furthermore, despite their inability to exercise voting rights, the ties and communities that
permanent residents built in Canada over time allow indirect democratic representation of the
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population and their political needs to be met. Their contribution to the Canadian economy and
nation-building project is widely acknowledged instead of facing public scrutiny.
TFWs, on the other hand, are forced to work under conditions of unfreedom due to their
position within the power relations of the national state (Freeman, 2004). Although the TFWP
appears to rely on economic compulsion in general, denizen status is the fundamental politicolegal mechanism of unfree labour. The assertion of being free is made in relation to unfree
others, who are simultaneously identified as racialized, ethnicized, gendered, and, importantly,
nationalized (Sharma, 2006). These TFWs with low-skill are more likely to experience language
and cultural barriers, have lower formal education levels, and increasingly be citizens of the
global South. For this reason, they occupy a socially and economically marginal position in
Canadian society and constitute distinct class from both citizens and permanent residents
(Marsden 2011).
The process of locating some workers as free and others as unfree is part of the nationbuilding project. National identity is attainable for citizens and permanent residents who are able
to legitimately claim membership in the civil society, in relation to those that are represented as
denizens, as are migrant workers in Canada. This emerging marginalized population resides
within a national territory of Canada and fulfills certain obligations, such as paying taxes, but
face both formal and informal exclusions due to being classified as the Others (Leitner &
Ehrkamp, 2016). They have been isolated in the geographical, economic, and social periphery of
the Canadian society, which often translates into specific occupations, actual places, and work
sites that are racially identified.
Racially defined spaces are consequences of public policy and legal sanctions, not the
unfortunate but irreversible results of purely private or individual choices (Marsden 2011). The
state locates the migrant workers at the bottom of the hierarchy of belonging through cultural
dichotomies like majority and minority, deserving and undeserving, normal and abnormal,
desirable and undesirable, and moral and immoral. The discourse of us-Canadians versus themTFWs facilitates the discussion of who constitutes as Canadians (Sharma, 2006). Furthermore,
this Othering process of state assigning differentiated legal categories of non-membership has
economic consequences; this materiality is based in the hierarchy of belonging, race, gender, and
class (Sharma, 2006).
A TFWs’ vulnerability as a denizen is shaped by several factors, including types of work
permit, country of origin, socio-economic status, and the amount of human capital he or she
possesses. First, individuals with different types of work permit encounter unique challenges in
relation to employment. In particular, employer-specific work permit typically specifies the
length, skill level, occupation, location, and employer, which limits the worker’s mobility within
the labour market and increases the TFW’s dependence on her employer (Benton, 2014). Next,
low-skilled TFWs’ vulnerability is magnified due to racial hierarchy that exists within the host
country. Recently, sending countries of low-skilled workers who experience Portes’ third mode
of incorporation shifted from traditional source countries, such as Western Europe and the
United States, to the Philippines, China, India, and Mexico (Palacio, 2017). These workers lack
access to accountability mechanisms and protection because their countries of origin do not have
considerable diplomatic influence (Benton, 2014). For example, European Union citizens enjoy
the protection of EU institutions regardless of their denizen status in Canada. Other factors
associated with the shift in source countries include language barriers, racial discrimination,
cultural differences, and the issue of belonging (Picot & Sweetman, 2012). These workers from
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the global South, in particular, are seen as a threat to a shared white national subjectivity and
channeled into the racialized second labour market.
Third, class struggle between workers and employers shapes the use and scale of unfree
labour (Sharma, 2006). Migrants with higher socio-economic status have more political
influence and bargaining power because the host country wishes to attract and retain them
(Benton, 2014). For these higher-skilled TFWs, the exit costs and level of dependency on
employers are likely to be lower as they can afford to migrate elsewhere. Consequently, they are
not as vulnerable as TFWs with low socio-economic status who are more likely to stay in
exploitative, unfree employment relationships. Lastly, workers with low human capital are more
likely to be vulnerable to domination (Benton, 2014). Lack of proficiency in official language
may make it difficult for these workers to understand and navigate through the system.
Moreover, highly-skilled workers enjoy favourable treatment from many countries and
are provided with opportunities to permanently settle in Canada, while many low-skilled workers
remain “permanently temporary” in the secondary labour market (Horgan & Liinamaa, 2017).
Often, their only hope for guaranteed permanent residency is either working as a domestic
caregiver under the Live-in Caregiver stream or having their employer or a Canadian spouse
sponsor them. Without having much options, many low-skilled migrant workers are channeled
into the secondary labour market and find themselves “stuck” in precarious occupations. For
example, the economic and social difficulties that domestic caregivers face during their time in
the program continue even after they obtain their permanent residency (Tungohan, Benerjee, &
Chu, 2015). In such a situation of minimal legality (Menjivar, 2006), the low-skilled workers are
forced to be highly dependent on private relationships, which is likely to translate to considerable
vulnerability to domination. Hence, these unskilled TFWs who possess weaker bargaining power
may find themselves dependent on exploitative employers for a job and their continued presence
in Canada.
These factors maintain low-skilled workers’ marginal social positions in the host country.
Denizenship is assumed to be a biological quality and representative of what the person actually
is. The argument of ‘undeserving’ Others justifies their lack of access to rights, inability to
participate in the civil sphere, insecurity in residence status, and limited mobility and flexibility
within the labour market (Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2016). Hence, denizenship is a salient and farreaching force that delimits a TFW’s everyday lives. Much of these limitations are shaped by
processes of racialization, the type and wages of job a person works at, and the conditions
applied to their legal status under the TFWP.

High- skilled and low-skilled TFWP Stream
Canada has been increasingly accepting temporary workers, both high and low skilled. In
fact, the number of work permits issued annually has eventually outnumbered the number of
permanent residents admitted for the last couple of years (Geddes, 2012). The notion of
denizenship is demonstrated in differential access to key social, economic, and civic rights
depending on the amount of human capital of a migrant (Clifton, 2010). For instance, the current
points system of the Canadian government is designed to encourage permanent settlement of
high-skilled temporary workers. They have the ability to extend their permit without leaving the
country as well as are entitled to bring their family, which help them integrate and form ties with
the Canadian society. As Canada moves to increase the employers’ access to migrant workers,
the government is increasingly adopting a two-step employer-demand driven system of
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recruitment (McDonald & Worswick, 2015). Thus, those with high-skills are provided with
opportunities to obtain permanent residency under various streams, including Provincial
Nominee Program (PNP), Canada Experience Class (CEC), and many others.
Although Manitoba and British Columbia have pathways to permanent residency
specifically designed for low-skilled workers, they often have to fit in narrow categories that are
employer-driven, and in some cases, occupation-specific. The permanent residency is contingent
on a job offer, wage that is higher than prevailing wage of the job, and a level of financial
independence that is often unrealistic for low-income workers to achieve (Polanco, 2016). In
addition, the offer is based on the relationship to a specific employer, which lends itself to a host
of violations, such as unpaid overtime work. The vulnerability of temporary workers created
corresponding to the neoliberal ideology allows employers to access a disciplined, committed,
and, thus, desired workforce. Such conditions benefit employers at the expense of workers, while
deteriorating work and employment conditions and downloading risks onto workers (Polanco,
2016). The limited pathway to permanent residency for low-skilled TFWs in general accentuates
the two-tiered nature of the TFWP.
The differential inclusion of TFWs based on skill categories have implications for nationbuilding and membership. Although the categories and entitlements used to distinguish classes of
working migrants are seemingly neutral in the language of their approach, the regulations in fact
legitimize particular social and ethnic groups as disposable workforce and exclude them from the
national community despite the evidence that refute the temporary nature of their labour. Such
differentiated citizenship politics will continue to have direct impacts on the well-being of lowskilled migrants (Clifton, 2010).

Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA)
Temporary migrant schemes demonstrate Canada’s strategic use of managed migration to
create a readily available pool of labour (Basok & Belanger, 2016). The Canadian government
created the category of denizens who were legally positioned as unfree, indentured labour. These
TFWs received little support from the public because they were perceived as a threat to
Canadians (Sharma, 2006). Limiting the access to certain rights and pathways to settlement for
non-immigrants emerged as a means to maintain the status quo and keep the Canadian border “in
control” without jeopardizing Canada’s new image as a “multicultural” society (Sharma, 2006).
In 1973, the Canadian government introduced the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization
Program (NIEAP), which issued employer-specific work permits and recruited workers from
overseas to meet the labour demands in agriculture and care work. The program restricted the
participants’ mobility within the Canadian labour market and did not provide pathways to
settlement. By making them perform work that was not attractive to Canadian workers who
enjoyed freedom in the labour market, the program worked to further differentiate who was part
of the Canadian national community (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009).
The notion of labour shortages that facilitated the NIEAP continued even after the
program was overhauled and transformed into a bifurcated Temporary Foreign Worker Program
(TFWP) at the turn of the 21st century. The ‘labour shortage’ referred to the job vacancies that
did not belong to Canadians based on the perspective of state-building and membership, rather
than quantitative or actual shortage of workers (Sharma, 2006). In fact, there is no universal
definition of labour shortage. These vacancies could typically be “solved” by employers
improving working conditions and raising prevailing wages. Instead, employers recruit TFWs to
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perform work that is not qualitatively attractive to Canadians in order to maintain the low wages
and employment conditions (Anderson & Ruhs, 2012).
Although the dual meaning of ‘labour shortage’ behind recruiting TFWs remained the
same, the TFWP entailed some significant changes to employment-specific work permit
requirements. The Canadian government started actively connecting the immigration to a
constantly changing economy (Clifton, 2010). In 2001, the government developed the National
Occupational Classification (NOC) system, of which became the basis of issuing work permits.
The work permits are now issued only when the employer applies for TFWs and the Employer
and Social Development Canada (ESDC) confirms that there is a mismatch between the skills of
local Canadians in the area and what is required for the position. As a result, employer-specific
work permits correspond to the NOC code based on the type of job duties and level of education
required to work in the occupation. Basically, when tied to the immigration system, the NOC
code is used to differentiate jobs that are contingent on a strong economy from the ones that do
not require the same level of training and are deemed risky for permanent entry (Clifton, 2010).
This process is called the Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA), formerly addressed as
Labour Market Opinion (LMO).
LMIA effectively maintains and conceals the disparities between the working conditions
of citizens or permanent residents and denizens. LMIA legitimizes the TFWs’ unfree labour and
lack of rights through creating a perspective that TFWs are brought into Canada just to fill in
temporary vacancies as employers continue to search for Canadian workers (Sharma, 2006). The
supposition renders the temporary nature of the jobs, which does not account for employers’
constant use of TFWs for low-paying, unattractive jobs in many sectors (Sharma, 2006).
Typically, Levels 0, A, and B occupations are grouped as “high skills” while Levels C
and D jobs are classified as “low-skill” (Lu & Hou, 2019). These skill categories in the case of
immigration policy are socially constructed and are linked to education level and the notion of
“labour shortage”, as well as to other social identities, such as race and gender (Rajkumar,
Berkowitz, Vosko, Preston, & Latham, 2012).

NOC Skill Level
0 Management occupations
A Occupations usually require university education
B Occupations usually require college education, specialized training or appreniceship training
C Occupations usually require secondary school and/or occupation-specific training
D On-the-job training is usually provided for occupations
Vulnerable Workers in Precarious Jobs
In 2002, the Canadian government introduced the Low-skilled Pilot Program mainly to
meet the demands of employers in Alberta’s tar sands and Toronto’s construction sector (Fudge
& MacPhail, 2009). Following employers’ lobbying efforts, in 2006 the elected Conservative
government transitioned and expanded the pilot into a stream for low-wage positions. The
change made the program even more accessible to employers by assisting them with the LMO
process in newly established local TFW support centers (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009). In addition,
the employers were only required to advertise the jobs to Canadians for 14 days (Palacio, 2017).
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Within a few years, the number of TFWs residing in Canada grew rapidly. The majority
of the growth occurred in lower-skilled occupations in industries such as agriculture, retail, and
administrative support as well as semi-skilled occupations in construction and trades. In Alberta
and British Columbia, one in every four low-skilled workers in hospitality, construction, and
tourism was a TFW. In 2008, 50% of total LMOs requested in food and beverage services,
cleaning and support industry in the two provinces were administered as part of the pilot
program (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009).
Employer-specific work permit makes the state control visible by imposing specific
conditions and regulations of freedom on the workers. These work permit holders are vulnerable
to two universal key issues. These concerns are as follows: (1) employment-related issues,
including non-payment or under-payment of wages and unauthorized deductions; and (2)
welfare, occupational health and safety issues related to accommodation, long working hours,
and workplace hazards (Goldring & Landolt, 2012; Piper, 2010). For instance, the pilot allowed
the employers to pay 5 – 15% below the median wage until the union voiced their concerns in
2012 regarding an increase in abuse and complaints (Palacio, 2017).
In June 2014, ESDC increased the LMIA employer application fee significantly from
$275 to $1,000 per worker and capped the number of hired TFWs at 10% of the total employed
labour force in the business. The cap, however, did not apply to employers with fewer than 10
employees and businesses in the agriculture and caregiving sector (Faraday, 2016). The policy is
one of the few that directly regulates the actions of an employer, rather than the TFW; the
official purpose of the reform was to deter employers from hiring TFWs, so that Canadians
would have increased employment opportunities (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009). While it achieved
its initial goal of reducing the number of newly approved LMIA applications by significantly, the
reform had negative impact on the economic well-being of temporary workers (House of
Commons Canada, 2016). According to the Migrant Mothers Project (2016), the rise in the fee
has led some employers to put the onus of covering these costs on low-skilled TFWs.
Employers are one of the groups that are most actively involved in the design and
administration of TFWP. A government that facilitates employers’ easy access to the TFWs runs
a risk of encouraging them to turn to the flexible workforce rather than improving working
conditions and wages. It should be the responsibility of the government and employers to address
the labour shortage by first investing in training and offering more desirable working conditions
and wages to workers, before looking to migrant workers to fill the jobs (Ontario Federation of
Labour, 2013). To ensure that employers are turning to low-skilled TFWs as the “last resort”,
they are required to promote the occupations to the Canadian public for certain period of time.
However, advertisement alone is not an effective measure to address the “labour shortage”—it
must be accompanied by higher wages and improved working conditions.
The low-skilled stream posits that “employers pay the temporary foreign workers the
prevailing wage rate for jobs of that type in the particular region” (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009,
p.9). The way that the prevailing wage is set, however, is controversial and opaque; the employer
establishes the wage rate for a specific job in his or her LMIA application, which is then
reviewed by the ESDC official who considers general labour market and specific industry
surveys completed by employers (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009). The details about employment
conditions, including wages, job responsibilities, work schedule, accommodation, and
insurances, are typically specified in employment contracts. TFWs, however, generally do not
have the opportunity to review or negotiate their contract before or upon their arrival in the
country, as it is an agreement between the employer and the ESDC.
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Furthermore, ESDC is not legally bound to regularly monitor and evaluate employer
compliance against the details specified in the initial contract (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009). It is
because the right to monitor and enforce contract requirements fall onto an employment
standards officer on a province level. Even then, these officers cannot intervene unless the TFW
files complaints. The federal government lacks mechanisms to enforce the rights of employees,
because the Canadian government, in fact, is not a party to the contract and therefore ESDC has
no authority to intervene in the employment relationship (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009). While both
levels of government offer protections to TFWs, they are inaccessible as each is limited in its
ability to enforce these rights.
Many employers are dissatisfied with how the prevailing wage is set up, believing that it
is too high; as such, some cases indicate employers simply ignore the suggested wage (Fudge &
MacPhail, 2009). Specifically, studies have demonstrated the negative effect of denizenship on
TFWs’ wages. Approximately 25% of low-skilled TFWs come from India, the Philippines, and
China (Palacio, 2017). According to the Census, non-permanent residents get paid an hourly
wage in between $10.10/hr and $19.10/hr depending on the industry, with the Filipinos being the
lowest earners (Palacio, 2017). In fact, most industry sectors pay migrant workers significantly
less than citizens and immigrants. For instance, Indian truck drivers earn wages 20% less than
that of Canadian-born truck drivers (Palacio, 2017). It is questionable whether TFWs have the
bargaining power to negotiate for higher wage and exercise their employment rights given
several barriers, such as their denizen status, fear of deportation, language barriers, and limited
knowledge in the Canadian system.
In addition to receiving low hourly wage, TFWs are often subjected to deduction in
paycheques. Commonly, employers rely on overseas agencies to advertise jobs, recruit potential
employees, and process immigration documents. Although it is legally specified that employers
should not charge the TFWs with any costs that incur during the recruitment process, there have
been numerous accounts of which agricultural workers from Mexico and the Caribbean were
forced to pay the processing fees since the LMO application fee was first introduced in 2012
(Hennebry & Preibisch, 2012). For example, a visa processing fee is first paid by employers
upfront for each agriculture worker and later deducted from their wages; they also get 5% of
their income deducted to cover travel expenses (Hennebry & Preibisch, 2012).
Furthermore, a TFW cannot change job without receiving a new offer from a prospective
employer who has a positive LMIA. There is a lot of confusion regarding the TFWs’ ability to
access Employment Insurance (EI) or other social assistance during this time for several reasons.
First, they must have worked a certain number of hours within the last 52 weeks to be qualified
for the benefits despite paying into it (Nakache, 2013). In addition, a claimant must prove their
willingness and capability to work as well as being unable to obtain suitable employment. The
nature of their employer-specific work permit, however, restricts the holder from being “ready to
work” for other employers (Nakache, 2013).
Eventually, a worker is put in an untenable situation of having to work jobs that pay cash
to make ends meet while they wait for a new work permit, which can take up to several months
(Nakache, 2013). In this time, TFWs are not able to access many of the basic support and
services, which exacerbates their vulnerability to abuse and exploitation (Polanco, 2016). Once
TFWs are legally available for work, it would mean they received a new work permit for another
employer with positive LMIA and therefore are no longer in need of EI. As a result, unions
representing TFWs claim that only a very small number of TFWs – less than 1 percent – can
access to regular EI benefits in Canada (MacLaren & Lapointe 2010). The confusion is
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consequences of policies and regulations that are designed to actively prevent settlement of
TFWs, especially the ones with low-skilled who have more difficulty finding a new employment.
As demonstrated in the example of EI, most TFWs are extremely unlikely to enforce their
rights despite, in theory, having the same basic employment and human rights as other workers
(Nakache, 2013). The lack of security of presence and employment retaliation are common
barriers to migrant workers raising their concerns and accessing the justice system.

TFW Protection Policies and Regulations
The provincial governments have been resolving employment-related complaints at
employment standards branches. However, these branches are understaffed and under-funded,
and, most importantly, they rely on TFWs’ reports rather than implementing proactive measures.
For instance, only eighteen out of 4,000 complaints received in Alberta in 2006 were from
people who identified themselves as TFWs (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009). In the recognition of
ineffective enforcement on a provincial level, the federal government entered into memoranda of
understanding (MOU) with the provinces in 2007 to strengthen the inspection and protection
mechanisms. Since then, the staff shortage at local offices in some of the provinces have been
addressed (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009).
As aforementioned, TFWs seldom proceed with their complaints about labour
exploitation or unlawful recruitment practices due to lack of secure status in Canada. By the time
they obtain permanent residency, an option that does not exist for many workers, the period of
which they can file complaints has often expired (Dalley, 2016). Even in the rare instance where
a worker does successfully seek justice, the worker may have left Canada by the time her
complaint is processed without receiving a substantial remedy (Dalley, 2016).
The federal government also launched a monitoring initiative in 2009. The initiative,
however, is favourable to employers, as they can choose not to participate in the program. In
fact, based on information obtained through access to information act requests to ESDC, 43 per
cent of employers who were issued positive LMOs from April 2009 to January 2010 did not give
their consent (Marsden, 2011). After 19 months of operation, only 7 employers were subject to
some sort of sanctions, such as corrective measures (Marsden, 2011). The voluntary nature of the
process results in self-selection of employers who comply. Even with high rates of participation,
the absolute lack of enforcement actions demonstrates inability of the initiative to provide
necessary protection for TFWs.
Furthermore, since 2010, the onus has been on workers to refuse to work for noncomplying employers (Marsden, 2011). Failure to do so could result in reporting and
enforcement actions against these workers. However, it is difficult to expect the workers to have
done a background check on the employers as many of them may not be familiar enough with
the Canadian system to navigate through it, experience language barriers, have limited access to
the internet, and most importantly, are not even aware of this obligation (Marsden, 2011). This is
especially true for low-skilled TFWs from the global South or workers who often complete the
immigration process through a third party, such as a recruitment agency.
The most recent audit of TFWP in 2017 made it clear that the ESDC was not effectively
using its resources it had to enforce these existing mechanisms in a meaningful way.
Specifically, the department was randomly selecting employers for inspection most of the time
despite having the information that workers in certain sectors, such as low-wage, caregiving, and
agriculture were most vulnerable to exploitation and poor working conditions (Office of the
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Auditor General of Canada, 2017). It only began inspecting agriculture employers in July 2015
and no caregiver employers were subject to inspection. As a result, one of the recommendations
made in the audit report for the ESDC was to take a comprehensive risk-based model and work
with provincial governments to identify high-risk employers. Amongst the inspections carried
upon randomly selected employers in 2017, only 13 of them were on-site (Office of the Auditor
General of Canada, 2017).
In addition, ESDC did not interview TFWs during any of these inspections, limiting the
workers’ representation in the process. Employers were also notified well in advance, given an
opportunity to take corrective measures. These actions that seem to greatly hinder the ability of
ESDC to select out non-complying employers are indirect results of the framing of this initiative.
According to the Canadian government, the purpose of the enforcement is to ensure “that
Canadians can have confidence that the program is being used as it should be”, rather than
improving temporary workers’ well-being or preventing mistreatment of these workers (Office
of the Auditor General of Canada, 2017). The consequence of such policy is exclusion of TFWs’
voices in the enforcement process.
The audit of TFWP fails to look beyond the interest of those granted membership into the
national community. For instance, it criticizes ESDC for not knowing whether the program had
“unintended consequences, such as suppressing wages, allowing business to rely on foreign
workers instead of hiring Canadians, or discouraging capital investment and innovation” (Office
of the Auditor General of Canada, 2017). None of these listed unintended consequences discuss
bifurcation of labour market based on racial and gender identity, erosion of human rights and
labour rights for low-skilled TFWs, or the harm that inadequate mechanisms may inflict upon
these workers. The concerns regarding the program should be expanded to include the impact it
has beyond Canadians and the Canadian labour market.
In short, although there is no national statistics on the frequency of TFWs mistreatment,
various account of persistent exploitation of low-skilled workers suggest that these instruments
are unlikely to have an ameliorative impact without an effective enforcement actions or viable
legal remedies that takes the generations of the systemic power structure of which the workers
were situated within into consideration (Marsden, 2011).

Making and Evaluation of Migration Policies
Although Canada eliminated explicitly discriminatory immigration policies, the dominant
group continued to retain the power structure and have disproportionate access to social and
economic benefits. Subsequently, it did not dissipate the racially identified spaces nor the
bifurcated labour market (Marsden, 2011). In a society with a history of racism, race neutral laws
and policies continue to entrench segregation and socioeconomic stratification of migrant groups.
One way the status quo is remained is through attaching differential entitlements to various legal
status.
Migration should be better understood as nested within a much broader and bigger
discussion about the state power and sovereignty as well as meaning of membership based on
presumed economic contribution (Geddes, 2006). For instance, migration policies have become
increasingly important in the era of globalization and staggering inequality between the global
North and the global South (Castles, 2004). Immigration policies can act as boundary institutions
that shape migratory experiences of TFWs, including their employment relationships, without
being direct interveners (Benerjee et al., 2018). Martin (2010) refers to boundary institutions as
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sites that “profoundly [affect] the structure of economic opportunity that she will confront, from
her ability to participate at all in employment, to the segment of the labour market open to her, to
the wages she will be paid” (p. 130). These migration policies, when developed based on shortterm and narrow views of the migratory process, often fail to achieve its goal and even run the
risk of causing unintended consequences (Castles, 2004).
There are several factors, such as competing interests and hidden agendas of different
groups, that affect the development of migration policies (Castles, 2004). It has been assumed
that liberal-democratic state changes as a result of primarily internal social and cultural dynamics
(Seidman, 2017). Civil society is at the centre of the dynamics, as it is the social sphere where
members of the national community participate to form public opinion and public policy.
Memberships that have historically been constructed through national identity helps to reinforce
the notion that there is one group, citizens, for whom the state rules and another group, TFWs
workers, that it rules over (Sharma, 2006).
Employers, unions, governments, and non-profit organizations typically constitute the
‘imagined community’ of the nation state. Together, they are considered to have the most impact
on designing, implementing, and evaluating a policy, as well as shaping and directing the
public’s reaction to the policy. While one group’s interests cannot easily be prioritized in the
policy development and evaluation process, historically, TFW program policies around the world
have been overwhelmingly instigated by employers due to the ‘clientelist politics’ of neoliberal
government (Castles, 2004). This was exemplified in the expansion of low-skilled stream as a
result of the agricultural or construction employers’ lobbying. Increased privatization and labour
market deregulation amplify the power of employers in the making and evaluation of TFWP
policies (Castles, 2004).
Migrants’ voice, on the other hand, is often not recognized due to their denizen status and
non-membership in the receiving country. Migrants are excluded from Canada’s political
community despite their presence in the labour market and the wider society. They are often the
passive objects of policy, the ‘problem’ to be solved (Geddes, 2006). Along with the weakened
inspection mechanisms and lack of global governance in relation to international migration,
migrant workers fall between the cracks of legal status protection (Castles, 2004; Walia, 2010).
They also receive little support from the wider public due to political discourse and media that
portrays them as a collective ‘threat’ to the Canadian labour market and national identity
(Sharma, 2006). As a result, the gap between the intents of national immigration policy and the
ways it is experienced by migrants themselves is growing wider in all industrialized democracies
(Cornelius, 1994, as cited in Castles, 2004).
Existing political and regulatory mechanisms function to further entrench segregation and
exclusion of TFWs in the Canadian society by maintaining their denizen status, which primarily
supports the interests of employers (Marsden, 2011). The federal government appears to keep
experimenting with the immigration policy in regard to the TFWP, as demonstrated in number of
changes that were made to the policy between 2002 and 2014, including the ones that are no
longer valid (Palacio, 2017). Although some scholars argue that the 2014 reform met the policy
objective of decreasing employers’ reliance on TFWs and hiring more domestic workers, some
of the changes have been criticized to have extended and even exacerbated the precarious
working conditions of foreign workers (Faraday, 2016).
Importantly, as demonstrated in the Audit Report of 2017, many of the policy outcomes
have not been evaluated using the evidence-based approach, especially in relation to how they
affect the well-being of low-skilled TFWs. An examination of the historical conditions that
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situates the TFWP within may lead to the recognition of migrant status as a basis for antidiscrimination claims against social, economic, and political exclusion (Marsden, 2011).

Recommendations
Given the reliance of Canadian government and employers on TFWs to address
qualitative labour shortage, the TFW population in Canada will only continue to grow.
Therefore, more adequate measures that account for unique circumstances that TFWs are
situated within should be put in place to mitigate the risks of abuse and poor working conditions
they may be subject to.
First, migrants should be agents of change. TFWs are a resilient and continuous group
with a contribution to make, but whose plight and interests are too often neglected due to their
denizen status (Geddes, 2006). To mitigate these constraints of denizenship, many non-profit
organizations across Canada, such as Migrante International, Migrant Workers Centre, Migrant
Workers Alliance for Change, and Migrant Rights Network, actively advocate migrants’ rights
on their behalf. It is important to ensure their voices are represented and integrated into the
planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of protection programmes. These
monitoring and corrective measures should expand its purpose from satisfying the demands of
the public to protecting the actual participants of TFWP—the temporary foreign workers.
Second, the communication between different levels of governments could reduce
inconsistent administration and confusion over day-to-day operations of the program. As
demonstrated in the cases of EI and the employment contract, the administration of the TFWP is
complex and confusing. While provincial government govern employment rights, LMIA, health
care, education and housing, the IRCC regulates the workers’ immigration documents and
admissibility requirements, and Canada Border Services Agency processes cases at the port of
entry (Nakache, 2013). For instance, an employer could get a positive LMIA but the prospective
worker who is applying for a work permit at the port of entry may be denied at the immigration
officer’s discretion. Given the shared federal-provincial jurisdiction of the TFWP, each of these
government department is somewhat restricted in its ability to resolve various challenges within
the program. Better communication between ESDC, CBSA, and IRCC will prevent TFWs from
falling into an apparent grey area, of which the IRCC admits to (Nakache, 2013).
Third, as mentioned above, one of the main factors that increases low-skilled TFWs’
vulnerability is their employer-specific work permit. The nature of this work permit bounds a
worker to a specific employer, exacerbating the existing power dynamics in employment
relationship. Replacing the employer-specific work permit with open-work permit that allows
TFWs to work anywhere in Canada for the limited period of time or even sector- or provincespecific work permit could ensure the migrant workers have some sorts of bargaining power and
protection.
Fourth, eligibility criteria for accessing settlement services should be expanded to all
migrant workers. Currently, the access to most supports and services is only available to
permanent residents. The pervasive notion that TFWs come to work in Canada temporarily and
will return once their work permits expire limits their access to federally funded settlement
services. However, as aforementioned, research has shown that TFWs have indeed become a
persistent feature of the Canadian labour market (Preibisch, 2007). Low-skilled workers,
particularly, have traditionally made invaluable contribution in different sectors and are
increasingly used by employers to fill permanent vacancies (Elgersma, 2014). The limited access
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to settlement services for TFWs lead to feelings of social exclusion in Canada, which directly
affects their well-being. Despite the effort made on the provincial and territorial or community
level to provide language training, transportation assistance, and orientation, the support is
uneven across the country (Elgersma, 2014).
The difficulties that TFWs experience, including social isolation, downward mobility,
and loss of skills, have long-term impact on their well-being even after they obtain permanent
resident status (Hou, 2019). TFWs’ consistent low income after they achieve permanent
residency is often used as a justification to limit their pathway to PR. This unsuccessful
transition, however, may be partially due to the fact that they did not have access to settlement or
language services when they arrived. Because TFWs—those with the option—must live in
Canada for certain amount of time to be eligible for permanent residency, not having access to
the support they need will have implications on their long-term relationship to Canada (Nakache,
2013).
Lastly, the Canadian government should expand the pathway to permanent residency for
low-skilled TFWs. Providing low-skilled TFWs with more opportunities for guaranteed
permanent residency would effectively address the underlying cause of their vulnerability
(House of Commons Canada, 2016). As previously mentioned, the work that TFWs are
employed for are, in fact, not temporary. Employers relying on disposable TFWs to fill
permanent vacancies will continue to create a growing population with fewer rights and supports
in relation to others who are deemed to be making more contribution to the Canadian society.
They are, and always have been important feature of our economy and community life and
should be entitled to stay in Canada permanently. It would also proactively protect the TFWs
from potential employer abuse to a great extent by empowering them to seek justice without
fearing for the possibility of retaliation.

Conclusion
The paper discussed the ways in which denizen status coupled with other social factors,
such as race and the amount of human capital, create marginalizing migratory experience for
low-skilled TFWs in Canada. Denizenship is the fundamental politico-legal mechanism of unfree
labour and non-membership. As denizens, these migrant workers are isolated in geographical,
economic, political, and social periphery of the Canadian society. The exclusion not only
undermines TFWs’ contribution to the Canadian society but also legitimizes the economic and
social integration challenges they experience.
The critical analysis of the government publications demonstrated the nation’s neoliberal
approach to TFWP, exclusively driven by the state’s economic gain. TFWs are unarguably a
group that is most directly affected by temporary foreign worker policies. These policies mediate
TFWs’ experiences in Canada in many ways from everyday interaction with their employer and
settlement service providers to their security of presence in Canada. In turn, overwhelming
representation of employers’ interests and lack of TFWs’ involvement in the making,
administration, and evaluation of the policies will continue to reproduce the precarity of these
workers and the broader racial, social, and political inequality of which they are situated within.
Thus, I conclude this paper by recommending ways to achieve a more inclusive and
equitable TFWP for low-skilled TFWs. I first suggest actively involving TFWs into the process
of planning and administration of protection mechanisms. Second, I recommend re-evaluating
the way TFWP is administered across different levels and departments of the government to
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simplify its day-to-day operations. Third, I suggest replacing employer-specific work permit with
open-work permit that allows mobility and freedom for TFWs in the labour market. Fourth, I
suggest expanding the eligibility criteria for government-funded settlement services to support
the social integration of these workers. Lastly, expanding the pathway to permanent residency
for the low-skilled TFWs will not only improve their overall working condition but also
effectively mitigate their social and political exclusions.
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